Agricultural and economic development strategies and the transformation of China and India: by von Braun, Joachim et al.
B
y any measure, China and—more
recently—India are striking economic
success stories. A few decades ago,
both countries were clearly among
the world’s poorest countries; now they are among the
world’s fastest-growing economies and are responsible for
nearly all the recent global progress in poverty reduction. 
In 1978 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in India
was $1,255—lower than the average for Sub-Saharan
Africa, which stood at $1,757.1 Since then it has climbed
steadily upward, reaching $2,732 in 2003. Even more
spectacularly, China’s GDP per capita, which stood at
$1,071 in 1978, jumped to $4,726 in 2003. China’s GDP
per capita growth rate is almost double that of India
(Figure 1). Moreover, the share of rural poor people fell
from 33 percent in 1978 to 3 percent in 2001, according
to official sources, or to around 11 percent, based on a
poverty line of less than a dollar a day, according to World
Bank estimates of 1998 (Figure 2). Despite ongoing con-
troversies regarding measures of poverty in China, both
benchmarks depict an extraordinary decline in the inci-
dence of poverty. India also achieved a downward trend in
poverty, although the outcomes were not as dazzling as in
China. According to official estimates, rural poverty in
India dropped from 50 percent in 1979/80 to 27 percent in
1999–2000, the latest year for which data are available.
Together these two countries accounted for a substantial
drop in global poverty levels, from 29.6 percent of the
world’s population in 1990 to 23.2 percent in 1999.2
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1 Figures for per capita GDP are in purchasing power parity terms with constant 2000 prices.
2 Excluding China, world poverty actually increased in absolute terms, from 917 million to 945 million people.
Figure 1 GDP per capita in China and India, 1950–2003 
Sources: China, National Bureau of Statistics, The Monitoring Report of Rural Poverty in
China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002); www.indiastat.com, 2004. 
Note: Poverty data for India are from large- and small-sample surveys by the National
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). Large-sample surveys are generally conducted at
five-year intervals. Since 1970, for example, they were conducted for the years 1973–74,
1977–78, 1983, 1987–88, 1993–94, and 1999–2000. The results from large-sample sur-
veys are considered more robust and reliable than those from small-sample surveys.































Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005 (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2005), CD-ROM; and A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002). 
Note: The data for 2000–2003 are taken from the World Bank, while the data for 1950–99 are
extrapolated using the trend of per capita GDP growth from Maddison. There have been con-
flicting reports on China and India’s per capita GDP. Maddison reported that China and India’s
GDP per capita measured in 1990 PPP were $439 and $619 respectively in 1950, and $3,259
and $1,818 in 1999.  But the World Bank reported a very different trend: as late as in 1978,
China’s GDP per capita was only $674 measured in 2000 international prices, 56 percent of
India’s $1,224. But in 2003 GDP per capita in China increased to $4,726 and India’s to $2,732.
Although we believe the World Bank has done a reasonably good job in estimating GDP in
international prices in more recent years, it is not clear to us how the World Bank estimated it
for earlier years. On the other hand, Maddison documented his estimates for all years from
1950 to 1999.  But, his series ran only to 1999. Therefore, we have used World Bank estimates
for 2000 to 2003, and then we used Maddison’s trend to backcast the numbers before 2000.
5Less well known than their recent blistering economic
performance, however, is the role that agriculture has
played in the transformation of these still heavily rural
and agricultural countries. In China agricultural reforms
were the starting point for economic liberalization—in
other words, reforms began in the sector where the
majority of poor lived, and they were largely the benefi-
ciaries of reform—whereas in India reforms started with
macroeconomic adjustment and trade and industrial pol-
icy, areas that did not benefit most of the poor. Although
agricultural growth in India rose to more than 4 percent
a year in the years immediately following the reforms
(1992–96), it could not be sustained, and it slumped to
about 2 percent a year during the period 1997–2003,
severely affecting its contribution to economic growth
and poverty reduction. The full potential of agriculture in
India has yet to be unleashed. Now, in 2005, agriculture
is once again high on the agenda of the Indian govern-
ment, which wants to give a rural orientation to the
entire reform and growth process. The reform experi-
ences of China and India—similar in some ways and dif-
ferent in others—shed light on the enormous potential
for investments and policies in support of pro-poor agri-
cultural and rural growth to fight poverty and malnutri-
tion in developing countries. 
REFORMS IN CHINA AND INDIA
Reforms that directly strengthened agriculture were a
major factor in China’s economic growth and poverty
reduction. Between 1978 and 1989, China underwent
two distinct phases of agricultural reform, which first
decentralized agricultural production through the
household responsibility system, giving farmers much
more leeway to decide what and how much to grow,
and then liberalized the systems for pricing and
marketing agricultural goods. Reported agricultural
production growth immediately shot up, from 2.6
percent a year during 1966–76 to 7.1 percent a year
during 1978–84 (Figure 3). Furthermore, growth in
agricultural productivity went from almost zero to 6.1
percent a year. Although production growth fell back to
2.7 percent a year during 1985–89 because of rising
input prices, further reforms in the 1990s again raised
production growth to 3.8 percent a year during
1990–97. As a result of the dramatic growth in
agriculture, rural people found their incomes rising by
15 percent a year between 1978 and 1984. 
But perhaps one of the most striking results of China’s
agricultural reforms was that they led to the creation of a
whole new economic sector that became the most
dynamic in China’s economy: the rural nonfarm sector—
the small-scale food-processing plants, machinery repair
shops, and increasingly more modern and technology-
intensive industries that cropped up to meet growing
demand among increasingly well-off farmers and to
employ the millions of people whose labor was no longer
needed on farms. Indeed, the whole structure of China’s






























Figure 3 Agricultural output and productivity in China and India 
Agricultural output Total factor productivity
Sources: Agricultural output: Authors’ calculations based on China, National Bureau of Statistics, The Monitoring Report of Rural Poverty in China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002); and
www.indiastat.com, 2003; Total factor productivity: Shenggen Fan and Xiaobo Zhang, “Production and Productivity Growth in Chinese Agriculture: New National and Regional Measures,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change 50, no. 4 (July 2002), 819–838; and Shenggen Fan, Peter Hazell, and Sukhadeo Thorat, Linkages between Government Spending, Growth, and


































China Indiahalf of the country’s GDP in 1952, it fell to 14 percent in
2004. Over the same period, the rural nonfarm sector
went from providing almost none of GDP to more than
one-third. The growth of this sector not only played a
large role in reducing rural poverty in China, but also put
pressure to reform on the urban sector, which has been
the main engine of growth since the 1990s. 
The story of agriculture in India is somewhat different. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Green Revolution, in
which Indian farmers adopted new high-yielding
varieties of wheat and rice, led to dramatic leaps in
agricultural production and raised farmers’ incomes. As
a result, rural poverty fell from 64 percent in 1967 to 56
percent in 1973 and to 50 percent in 1979/80.
Production gains from Green Revolution technologies
continued through the mid-1980s and then slowed
sharply. In the 1970s India had adopted subsidies for
agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and electricity for
pumping irrigation water, and these subsidies grew to
help maintain agricultural production but started
placing a strain on government budgets. 
Beginning in 1991 India instituted a series of sweeping
macroeconomic reforms. Although these initial reforms
were not directed toward agriculture, they helped
stimulate a rise in agricultural growth by generating
greater demand for a wide range of agricultural
products and by leading to increased private investment
in agriculture. From 1991/92 to 1996/97, agriculture
grew at an annual rate of 4.1 percent and rural poverty
fell only from 39.1 percent in 1987/88 to 37.3 percent
in 1993, and further to 27.1 percent in 1999/2000. After
the government opened the agricultural sector to
international trade in the face of falling world prices of
most agricultural products during the late 1990s,
agricultural growth slowed again, averaging 2 percent
between 1997/98 and 2003/04. Various studies have
shown that whenever there is higher agricultural
growth, there is greater poverty reduction in rural areas.
Now further steps are needed in India to again
stimulate strong agricultural growth, including
investments in roads, irrigation, and other infrastructure,
improvements in education, and greater emphasis on
growing high-value agricultural goods like fruits and
vegetables instead of only cereals.
LESSONS FROM CHINA AND INDIA
What can we learn from the process of economic reform
in these two countries? Does the sequencing of reforms
matter? What lessons do the experiences of China and
India offer for other developing countries and countries
in economic transition? What could China and India































7To Reduce Poverty Faster, Begin with 
Agricultural Reforms
China’s reforms led to acceleration in agricultural growth
from 1978 to 2002 (4.6 percent per year, as opposed to
2.5 percent per year from 1966 to 1977). The most
substantial decline occurred in the first phase of reform,
from 1978 to 1984, when agricultural GDP jumped to 
7.1 percent per year and the percentage of rural poor
dropped from 33 to 11 percent of the population. 
By launching market-oriented reforms in agriculture,
China was able to ensure that economic gains were
widespread and thus build consensus for the
continuation of reforms. Besides, prosperity in
agriculture favored the development of rural nonfarm
activities, which, by providing additional sources of
income beyond farming, were one of the main factors
behind China’s rapid poverty reduction after 1985. As
the rural nonfarm enterprises became more competitive
than the state-owned enterprises, the government
expanded the scope of policy changes and put pressure
on the urban economy to reform. Reforms of the state-
owned enterprises in turn triggered macroeconomic
reforms, opening up the economy further. 
In India, on the other hand, even though overall
economic growth was high, it is clear that slower growth
in agriculture was the major reason behind the slower
poverty reduction. Prompted by macroeconomic
imbalances, India’s reforms began with macroeconomic
and nonagricultural policy changes. The reforms led to
impressive rates of economic growth in the 1990s, but
since reforms were largely focused on the nonagricultural
sectors, they had limited impact on poverty reduction.
Agricultural policy changes occurred only at later stages,
and even then were only partial. Therefore, the evidence
suggests that successful agriculture-led reforms reduce
poverty faster.
Make Reforms Gradually and Carefully
At the outset of reforms in China, policymakers withdrew
central planning and reduced the scope of government
procurement while expanding the role of private trade
and markets. Thus they first created the incentives and
institutions required by the market economy; then, in the
mid-1980s, they began to open up markets. Studies show
that the incentive reforms—in the form of greater land
use rights, decentralized agricultural production
management through the household responsibility system,
and rises in procurement prices—from 1978 to 1984 had a
greater impact on growth than did market liberalization
reforms per se after 1984. Incentive reforms in China
allowed markets to emerge gradually, so unlike other
countries in transition, China did not experience a sudden
collapse of central planning in the absence of market-
based allocative mechanisms. Parallel with reforms in
output markets, reforms in the pricing and marketing of
inputs, including fertilizer, machinery, fuel, feed, seeds,
and energy, have transformed a system of state-controlled
quotas and prices into a largely market-driven system.
Today the role of government is limited to quality control
of input supplies. Subsidies for fertilizer and machinery
imports and domestic manufacturing have also been
eliminated. In the irrigation sector, the state is still
responsible for large-scale investment, but farmers or
local governments are responsible for local investments
and maintenance of the lower end of the system.
This favorable sequence of reforms came about not so
much through the planning of Chinese policymakers, but
rather through their trial-and-error approach to reform.
Instead of following a predetermined blueprint, they
adopted new measures through experimentation—in the
words of Deng Xiaoping, “crossing the river while feeling
the rocks.” Each new policy was field-tested and
determined to be successful in selected pilot districts
before the policy was applied nationwide and the next
measure introduced. This gradual approach to reforms,
beginning with the strengthening of market institutions
and incentives and moving toward the opening up of
markets, appears to lead to more substantial rates of
growth and poverty reduction.
India’s quite different experience also supports this
assertion. India’s reforms in the agriculture sector began
with agricultural trade reforms, despite the fact that the
incentive structure of Indian agriculture was highly
distorted; the sector was, and still is, burdened with
excessive regulations on private trading and most market
activities. The liberalization of agricultural trade policies
in the mid-1990s, coming before incentive and market
reforms in the domestic arena, created a series of
imbalances. Lowered protection against a backdrop of
low international prices increased agricultural imports in
the late 1990s and led to an unprecedented
accumulation of foodgrain stocks at home. 
8Reform Incentives before Opening Markets 
China’s experience with marketing reforms can be valuable
for other economies transitioning from a centrally planned
to a market system. Policymakers embarking on the reform
path should first increase incentives for production and
build the institutions needed to operate efficiently in a
market economy before rushing to open up markets. 
In a situation of food oversupply and liberalization of
agricultural trade, farm support policies geared toward
self-sufficiency lose their original rationale. In India
minimum support prices and input subsidies, initially
intended to encourage the adoption of new technologies
and fuel agricultural growth, increasingly turned from
incentives into inefficient and costly income-support
interventions. It is clear that once support measures have
completed their function, they need to be abolished.
Otherwise they lead over time to inefficiencies and the
crystallization of vested interests, resulting in the slowing
of growth and poverty reduction.
China could learn from the experience of India and seek to
encourage agricultural growth in the future while at the
same time avoiding the large inefficient subsidies provided
to its agricultural sector. This issue is of increasing
relevance given the recent introduction of the direct
transfer program to farmers and the emphasis placed by
many scholars and government officials on increasing
government support to agriculture and rural areas.
Although agricultural marketing reforms in India were
limited, state governments were
reluctant to implement them and thus their impact was
reduced. In addition, a host of outdated domestic
regulations under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955
continue to weaken the environment for agribusiness and
private sector involvement in agricultural marketing,
which could boost employment and efficiency. Against
the backdrop of rising and diversifying food demand and
liberalized agricultural trade, reform of these regulations
is increasingly critical, as it has a direct impact on the
capacity of the sector to adjust to the changing context.
Given that smallholder agriculture is predominant in both
countries, farmers could be excessively penalized because
they do not possess sufficient capital and information to
manage the risks inherent in agricultural activities. While
China and India are reconsidering current forms of
agricultural and input subsidies, they should put in place
well-targeted and innovative, cost-effective crop
insurance policies to protect vulnerable farmers from
drastic supply and price shocks.
One other important area is the strengthening of the
network of support services for small farmers related to
information, credit, and extension. India seems to be
better off than China in these areas, particularly with
regard to the institutional infrastructure of rural credit
and marketing, although the reach of its services may
not be perfect. The Indian experience shows that
smallholder agriculture needs strong institutional support





































support . . . to
grow and prosper. In terms of trade liberalization, both countries made
progress in reducing protection levels, but the weighted
average tariff in India, at 29 percent, is almost double
China’s 16 percent. India has been able to sustain its
current growth rate with lower inflows of foreign direct
investment and a weaker export orientation than China. If
India is to attain the target of 8 percent growth in GDP, it
may do well to follow through with reforms to foreign
direct investment in view of their potential to transfer
know-how, managerial skills, and new technologies. China
can offer valuable lessons in this regard. 
The inevitable restructuring and adjustments involved in
opening up agricultural trade flows will produce both
winners and losers. Domestic producers of crops for which
the country lacks a comparative advantage (such as edible
oils in India and wheat and maize in China) are likely to
suffer increasingly from falling prices induced by an
increase in imports. In addition, broad-based structural
adjustments in the economy may depress rural incomes and
increase opportunities in the manufacturing and service
sectors, located primarily in urban areas. These intersectoral
adjustments are likely to result in a reduction in the size of
the primary sector, which will release additional unskilled
labor into the labor markets. The rural population will gain
if it is able to shift to more profitable off-farm occupations.
Investment in rural education will be crucial in increasing
farmers’ ability to move out of farming. It will also be
important to increase investments in rural R&D and
infrastructure in order to enhance productivity. 
Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) can
provide useful external pressure to improve efficiency
and implement reforms, particularly for tradable inputs
such as seeds, fertilizers, farm machinery, and pesticides,
where markets are regarded as inefficient because of
either government intervention or lack of infrastructure.
The implementation of the various agreements under the
WTO can facilitate the role of the government in
providing services related to information, marketing
facilities, technical assistance, and laws and regulations
related to standards and quality control. Lastly, the WTO
offers an opportunity for China and India to join hands
and create a third bloc of countries besides the European
Union and the United States in trade negotiations.
Improve Health, Education, Infrastructure, and
Land Use at an Early Stage
The initial conditions of health, education, and land use
also made a difference in the performance of reforms in
China and India. In 1970 life expectancy was 49 years in
India and 62 years in China; illiteracy affected nearly 70
percent of the Indian rural population compared with 49
percent in rural China. These differences may be
accounted for by the fact that under the collective
system in China, the government provided free basic
health care and education to the rural population. After
the start of reforms, both countries recorded a
slowdown in the advancement of health and education.
In India this was primarily due to the fiscal discipline
imposed by the macroeconomic crisis, whereas in China
market-oriented reforms introduced the logic of profit
into the management of social services. This implied
progressive privatization of supply agencies, a decline in
government subsidies, and an increase in education and
health costs, leading to an increase in school dropouts
and in the health vulnerability of the population. In
devising mechanisms to address the risks involved in the
increased privatization of social services, China could
perhaps learn from India’s long experience with a vast
array of government safety nets and welfare programs
targeting the rural population.
China had also made more progress on rural
infrastructure than India. Chinese government
investment in power grew at 27 percent a year from
1953 to 1978, and rural electricity consumption grew at
a rate of 27 percent a year from 1953 to 1980, then
slowed to 10 percent a year from 1980 to 1990. In India
rural infrastructure did not receive as much attention,
particularly in the rural power sector, and thus rural
electrification and the establishment of telecommuni-
































villages. This slow pace severely affected the growth of
agroprocessing and cold storage in the rural nonfarm
sector. It is no wonder, therefore, that the levels of
processing in Indian agriculture remain abysmally low. 
In China the egalitarian access to land ensured by the land
distribution and tenure system performed a crucial welfare
function, providing the bulk of the rural population with
access to a basic means of subsistence and limiting the
number of landless. In India, on the other hand, land
reforms to make the agrarian structure more equitable
after independence were not as successful and left a
relatively large number of landless agricultural laborers
exposed to the negative consequences of unemployment
and underemployment. Replicating the Chinese agrarian
system does not seem politically feasible in India at this
stage of development, so marginal and landless farmers will
require a strong social protection system involving well-
targeted social security and employment policies. Effective
social protection measures will also be required in China,
where land distribution is likely to become more skewed
following the adoption of the new agricultural lease law
that enables farmers to transfer lease rights and thus
allows for the possibility of a higher concentration of land. 
FURTHER REFORMS ARE NEEDED
IN BOTH COUNTRIES
While both countries have made remarkable progress in
terms of growth and poverty reduction, much remains to
be done given the sizeable share of the population still
living in poverty. The two countries are confronted with
the formidable challenges of accelerating growth,
improving efficiency, and ensuring that growth is
equitable and sustainable.
Focus on Public Investments That Can Boost
Agricultural Productivity Efficiently
Given the key role of agriculture in poverty reduction and
growth in China, public investments that boost agricultural
productivity appear warranted. Significant increases in
public investments seem unlikely because of budget
pressures, so China and India will need to invest existing
resources more efficiently. Studies have found that
investments in agricultural research, education, and rural
roads hold the greatest potential to promote agricultural
growth and poverty reduction in both countries.
Farmers will have little potential to increase the amount
of land they cultivate, so agricultural research and
technology development is needed to help them increase
agricultural growth by boosting their yields. Agricultural
R&D takes place in both the public and the private
sectors, but managing public versus private agricultural
R&D can be tricky. In a bid to increase research funding,
China promoted the development of the public business
sector through commercialization of technologies by
public research institutes. This approach often led,
however, to the duplication of research with state-owned
traditional research institutes. Improved intellectual
property rights (IPR) regimes have stimulated private
research and patenting activity in both countries.
However, weak implementation of IPR in both countries
and the high costs of maintaining patents in China are
obstacles to the entry of new private players. 
Significant opportunities for public-private partnerships
can arise in the areas of funding, improving efficiency,
and extension. The private sector, however, tends to favorhigher-value crops and concentrate in areas where
agriculture is already advanced. Given the potential of
agricultural research for poverty reduction in marginal
regions, public research spending should focus on
addressing the needs of poorer farmers in less-favored
environments, such as India’s semiarid tropics and rainfed
areas and China’s poor western regions.
Past government spending on irrigation, dominated by
creation of large surface irrigation schemes, played an
important role in promoting agricultural growth and
poverty reduction, but today similar spending has smaller
marginal returns, in terms of both growth and poverty
reduction. It might be the case that investment in rainfed
areas or traditionally lower-potential areas has higher
returns today. Indeed, studies have shown that investments
in rainfed areas of both countries have had high marginal
returns for agricultural growth and poverty reduction. So
major investments in harvesting rainwater through
watersheds, through public-private partnerships, may help
usher in a “multicolored revolution” (not just a “green” one)
in agriculture. In both countries there is also vast scope for
improving water use efficiency through institutional and
management reforms of the existing water systems. India
has had useful experiences with water user associations in
some selected states, participatory watershed schemes, and
community-based rain harvesting. But these successful
experiments need to be scaled up to make a significant
difference for agriculture growth and poverty reduction. In
China providing irrigation system managers with incentives
to improve user efficiency had a positive effect on crop
yields, the groundwater table, and cereal production. 
Providing the right incentives to farmers is crucial to
promote water saving. Low water prices and profligate
subsidies on power for operating tubewells encouraged
wasteful use of water and depletion of groundwater
resources. Ambiguous water use rights following
decollectivization in China, and laws linking water rights
to land ownership in India, also led to inefficiencies. For
example, unfair water markets emerged over time, in
which rich landholders who can afford modern water
extraction technology profit by selling water to poorer
cultivators. Increases in water use charges may not be
feasible in the short to medium term, however, without
changes in the institutional environment. 
Another distinctive pattern among the two countries in
the past two decades is the much higher savings rates in
China (about 45 to 50 percent) than in India (about 25 to
30 percent). The high Chinese savings rates, which
facilitated boosting investments, are a puzzle in
international comparisons. They might have been
stimulated by high expected returns, including from
investments in education, a matter which warrants
further research. 
Promote Rural Diversification and 
Vertical Coordination
A major shift in farm production toward non-foodgrain
products such as livestock, fish, and horticulture has been
well under way in India and China since the 1980s. The
experience of China shows that achievement of food self-
sufficiency and the extraordinary growth in basic grain
production experienced by the late 1970s was a necessary
12
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precondition for diversification. The availability of food
surpluses provided the government with enough leeway
to feed the increasing population and relax controls over
the foodgrain sector. Once food self-sufficiency was
achieved, China gradually abandoned the policies biased
in favor of rice and wheat, encouraging farmers to
diversify production. In India, on the other hand, rising
minimum support prices artificially boosted production of
major cereals, discouraging diversification of production
toward nongrain commodities. Moreover, policymakers
must step up investment in research on and infrastructure
for high-value products such as livestock and horticulture
to boost yields and expand their cultivation and
processing, given their export potential, positive impact
on smallholders, and growing domestic demand.
Rising consumer demand for non-foodgrain products is a
major force driving diversification. Without vertical
coordination of production, processing, and marketing—
that is, between “plow and plate”—the potential for
growth inherent in the diversification process is likely to
remain underexploited. Both countries must strengthen
the innovative institutional arrangements that have
emerged to promote the development of new products.
India’s successful experience with contract farming in
reducing risks, promoting the production and export of
high-value foods, and increasing the income and
employment of smallholders could be valuable for China.
China’s experience with growth in retail food chains and
supermarkets in recent years could benefit India, where
restrictions on foreign investment and infrastructure
bottlenecks are limiting development in these areas. 
Another dimension of rural diversification is provided by
the evolution of a vibrant rural nonfarm sector. China’s
experience is instructive. The rapid growth of rural
enterprises in China was a critical factor in the success
of its reforms, especially in relation to poverty reduction.
China’s township and village enterprises (TVEs) provided
increasing job opportunities outside agriculture, thereby
diversifying and expanding the sources of household
income. TVEs benefited from the close connection with
urban markets that had been established since the early
stages of their development. 
India’s nonfarm economy primarily produces for the rural
population and markets and is dominated by tiny, family-
operated units. These firms have low productivity because
of a poor technological base and policies aimed to
protect rural employment by reserving certain activities
for small-scale units. Limited growth of rural nonfarm job
opportunities in India is also related to the lack of
knowledge and skills on the part of the poorly educated
rural labor force. 
The role of nonfarm employment is expected to become
increasingly significant in the context of smallholder
agriculture as the average farm size gets smaller. Greater
off-farm opportunities and migration to urban areas are
required to increase average farm size as well as labor
productivity and farmers’ income.
Use Well-Targeted Antipoverty Programs and
Safety Nets to Help the Poorest 
The role of safety nets in poverty alleviation came into
focus during the 1990s as China and India recognized the
need to address the negative effects of liberalization
policies on income distribution. Poverty funds and
programs have documented shortfalls and inefficiencies
in terms of targeting and cost-effectiveness, but they
have contributed significantly to limiting the severity and
the extent of poverty. There are still more than 300
million rural poor in India and China, based on the
international standard of one dollar a day (more than
100 million in China and more than 200 million in India).
Antipoverty programs can be more practical and agile
instruments for tackling poverty in the short run than
public investments or radical redistributive measures
such as land reforms. Given the fiscal discipline imposed
by macroeconomic stabilization reforms, however, it is
crucial to address the shortcomings of antipoverty
programs. The experience of India shows that using a
variety of targeted programs directed to specific sections
of the poor can help improve targeting compared with
the broader income- or area-based approaches
traditionally implemented in China. 
Decentralized and participatory approaches are more
effective at strengthening the impact of antipoverty
programs than top-down strategies and involve a greater
variety of agents (NGOs, civil society, and international
aid) in the fight against poverty besides the government.
In India the extensive participation of panchayats (forms
of local government with heavy public participation) and
civil society at various stages of formulating andimplementing antipoverty programs ensures that
programs are tailored to local needs and can be carried
out without extensive leakage.
Work to Make Governance Both Effective 
and Transparent
In both countries there was political will to carry out
reforms, but in practice, outcomes have been shaped by
the different patterns of governance. India is a “debating
society” in which political differences are expressed
freely, policymaking is exposed to pressure by various
interest groups, and there are thus long debates before
decisions are made. Subsequently, implementation is
slowed by the lengthy bureaucratic procedures, set up to
ensure checks and balances. This exercise, while
compatible with the needs of a free and dynamic polity,
considerably slows the pace of economic reforms. China,
in contrast, is a “mobilizing society” in which decisions
are made faster and state power is backed by mass
mobilization. As a result, implementation of decisions is
more effective, although the lack of extensive debate in
China on major changes and reforms can also lead to
disastrous courses of action, such as the “Great Leap
Forward” in 1958, which resulted in massive famine, and
the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. As the
economic system opens up further and prosperity
increases, it will become harder and harder to reconcile
the centralized political setup with the more liberal
economic system, and this is one of China’s most
important challenges today. 
Although investments in rural infrastructure and other
key public services are crucial, it is equally critical to
develop suitable institutional arrangements for their
delivery. In both countries the government is the major
supplier of infrastructure services, but there are major
failures and inefficiencies in provision owing to the lack
of transparency and accountability. Strengthening the
public institutions that provide public goods and services
can lead to both fiscal sustainability (through significant
cost reductions) and long-term growth (through
improved quality of services provided). These goals can be
achieved in different ways, including privatization,
unbundling, decentralization, and contracting. Effective
public institutions also require an adequate supply of
trained and motivated personnel, as well as investments
in training to help increase the supply.
Reforms have also been slowed at the implementation
level by the regulatory environment and enforcement
bureaucracy. In India, many inefficiencies remain in place,
although reforms, including de-licensing, have been
introduced to streamline the regulatory apparatus. During
the reform years China relaxed regulations on mobility
between rural and urban areas, which gave impetus to
the development of the nonfarm sector and increased
migration for economic purposes. In recent years the
Chinese government has also started to relax the
complex system of regulations affecting broad-based
personal mobility.
Finally, with regard to the political systems, effective
implementation of reforms in China was facilitated by a
high level of centralization of decisionmaking, which
minimized dissent. In the context of a democratic system
and highly pluralist society such as India, consent is more
difficult to achieve, and it is much more difficult to set
clear objectives or timeframes for transition (such as for
phasing out subsidies, reducing tariffs, or increasing
prices). This situation slows the pace of change in the
short and medium run. Although democracy and
participation have intrinsic value and are not just
instruments of development, the role of democracy in
enhancing or hampering economic change and poverty
reduction remains a complex subject for development
research. Comparisons of China and India on these broad
political matters may produce a fascinating set of

































A number of factors help to explain the difference in
growth during the pre-reform era: initial conditions, the
sequencing and pace of reforms, and the political system,
institutions, and regulatory environment. Yet special
mention must be made of the fact that China and India
achieved remarkable development and growth even as aid
as a percentage of GDP in the two countries remained
low. This is in direct contrast to most other developing
countries and regions, where aid is much higher but
commensurate development and poverty reduction
outcomes have not been realized. This fact bears an
important lesson for developing and developed countries,
multilateral agencies, and local NGOs and groups. It
questions the very basis of current policy prescriptions
that accompany aid packages, not only raising issues
related to the efficiency and effectiveness of external aid
but also, conversely, revealing the extraordinary and often
underestimated capacity of national initiatives and policy
actions to halt—and in fact turn—the tide of poverty. 
Both countries now face tremendous challenges on the
path to further prosperity. Continued growth is a must,
owing to pressure from population growth and the need
for employment. It is also a condition for a more stable
society. Given the high expectations of their citizens, the
lack of growth or even slower growth could lead to
unrest in both countries. The limited natural resource
base can be a critical constraint to growth. The future
economic growth of both countries increasingly depends
on imports of energy, for which future prospects are
uncertain. Both countries are also among those most
severely affected by water shortages. Consequently,
future growth must be based on higher efficiency and
will require China and India to invest in science and new
technologies to harness energy and water, optimize their
economic structures for allocative efficiency, and reform
their fiscal, financial, banking, and insurance systems.
Both countries must also pursue more pro-poor growth,
which is not only a development objective in itself, but
also a precondition for future growth in the long term.
China and India can both gain tremendously by learning
from each other, as both nations still face a long road
ahead. The dragon has attained height and the elephant is
starting to gather momentum, but both need to address
their weaknesses and build on their strengths in order to
achieve their national goals and fulfill the aspirations of
their people. The lessons learned from the experiences of
China and India are also of relevance to other developing
countries and the fight against global hunger and poverty.
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